"...Manufacturers told the subcommittee Monday that some faced financial ruin without the bill, which the Congressional Budget Office estimates could cost taxpayers...."1
"We appeal to your sense of justice!"
That's how the American Apparel Manufacturers Association begged the Senate for $50 million in 1981, pleading with legislators to approve the Tris Indemnification Act. Tris (2,3-dibromoprophyl) phosphate (tris) was used as a fire retardant in children's sleepwear in the 1970's, but the government banned its use in kids' pajamas when studies showed that it could be absorbed into the skin and could cause cancer. The apparel association wanted some payback.
$50 million seems like pittance now, given the billions flying around as the 2008 US government hopefully sprinkles newly minted, crisp Treasury dollars about. The back story of American Apparel Manufacturing in the 1970's is clearly different than the insurance, bank and auto-industries of 2008. But there are similarities. Behind many bailout stories, it turns out, is a coincidental trail of deregulation. Deregulation that's good for business.
Autos and Chemicals in Deregulated America
Today's beggarcorps, the auto, bank, and insurance companies, greedily sucked as much money as possible out of the Great Market and its Invisible Hand until it showed signs of withering. Companies shunned deregulation, oversight and caution. Once market money dried up, like insatiable green blooded Aliens or Predators, the CEOs stoop to clamber out of their Neon concept cars and pursue taxpayer dollars.
In the case of the auto industry, history repeats itself. Reagan bailed the industry back in the 1980's after Carter left the White House. Carter tried to wean the US, but Reagan declared morning in America. As they say in Michigan, Reagan "really pulled the fat out of fire for the auto industry". But how did the automakers use the good will, deregulation and limits imposed on Japanese import cars, grandly granted to them by Reagan?
Not to pursue wise business practices. Reagan's bailout not only bought the auto industry time, it helped cement expectations for habitual handouts. Auto CEO's learned how to fly to Washington on a Jet, fling out minimal rhetoric circa 1970 about: "the health of the industry", then fly back to Michigan and continue to sell good 'ole oil-hungry "safe" cars -- at a rate of two and three per household. Now, they're forced to offer two-for-one sales and occasionally even drive to bailouts in their own vehicles.
The chemical industry did even better under Reagan. It never floundered like the auto industry has, but thrived under deregulation and continued to grow into the behemoth we know today. Its size allows the chemistry industry to produce more and more consumer products, under less and less scrutiny. On occasion citizens become apoplectic about something like bisphenol A, but the industry's size make it more than capable of mowing down potential regulation or even, heaven forbid -- threats to remove a chemical from the market. As with the auto industry, "idealistic" long-term consumer goals like non-polluting products routinely fall by the wayside to quarterly profits.
Tris History - In Brief
The story of Tris is interesting, because it was banned in the US before the chemical industry became adept at protecting its economic interests so thoroughly. Tris was an unusual chemical in that it only had a quick sojourn in pajamaland before being banned. In 1971 the U.S. produced about 3 million pounds of tris. That year the Department of Commerce established flammability standards for children's pajamas. The chemical industry saw the opportunity in that particulas regulation and promoted tris for use as a fire retardant in children's sleepwear, essentially without any preliminary studies on the chemical's safety. 3 years later Tris production in the U.S. was 12 million pounds.
Then rat studies showed toxicity and kidney cancer from exposure to tris and rabbit studies showed that the chemical was absorbed through the skin. These were followed by human studies showing that kids absorbed tris too. Congress had just established the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) in 1972 as part of the Consumer Product Safety Act. The Environmental Defense Fund, also recently formed after its successful legal action against the use of DDT, threatened to sue the CPSC if it continued delaying. The CPSC banned tris in 1977.
Carter: The Presidential Scrooge of Toxic Chemicals
Once the US banned tris, textile manufacturers sold their tris pajamas overseas until President Jimmy Carter ordered them to stop. Carter said he wanted countries to know "that the United States is a responsible trading partner and that they can trust goods bearing the label 'Made in the U.S.A." (AP Feb., 1981)
Despite their overseas sales, however the textile industry claimed losses of $50-$100 million in business as a result of the ban. Textile manufacturers demanded government compensation via a bill passed by Congress in 1978, saying that they tried to abide by government regulation and took a loss.. But Jimmy Carter vetoed the indemnification bill, saying the resulting litigation would cost too much and only large retailers would be able to fund lawsuits. Carter noted that the companies had alternatives flame retardants to tris, and advised that the bill would set "an unwise precedent [to] paying industry for losses" incurred to industries when subsequent research showed a particular chemical was dangerous. Instead Carter offered business loans.
The Greatest Presidents
When President Reagan was elected, he promptly revoked Carter's executive order on exports. This allowed US companies to ship abroad hazardous products banned in the US. This is now a common practice known as dumping. A Reagan congress promptly rewrote a Tris Indemnification Act to allow textile manufacturers to sue for damages, which the legislature estimated would cost taxpayers $56 million dollars or more. Senators like Strom Thurmond (R-SC) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) helped sponsor the bill that Reagan signed into law.
US citizens have been swept along for years of these policy battles over fire retardants. In the 1970's California was one of the first to require fire retardants, and California children became some of the first in the nation to wearing tris pajamas. When tris was banned in 1977, the chemical industry replaced it with dichlorinated tris, which the CPSC then also banned from pajamas.
The chemistry industry then quickly introduced chemicals called polybrominated diphenylethers (PBDE's). Europe and Sweden banned all PBDE's. In the US, anufacturers of Penta and Octa PBDE's only recently stopped producing these chemicals due to toxicity. But individuals states first had to pass legislature which threatened the PBDE market. Now, many US states plan to ban Deca-PBDA. For each chemical banned, however, which is few and far between, several more spring up, all untested for safety. But chlorinated tris, banned from pajamas years ago, is now used to flame proof furniture today.
The cigarettes that ignited most fires that these anti-flammability chemicals protect consumers from are not only less in use, but they're finally required by law to be self-extinguishing. Now fire deaths from flaming pajamas are even less than when tris was introduced. Despite the decreased home fire risk, in 2007 the Bush administration pushed through a nationwide flammability law. The law attracted attention mostly for clauses it contained that pre-empted states from taking their own measures against flammable products, either by stricter laws or as a result of tort law.
Acronym Required discussed this trend in the Bush administration to hoard power at the executive level when we talked about greenhouse gas emission regulation in The EPA and the Automobile Manufacturers Lobby, Snuggly Under their "Patchwork Quilt"?, and http://acronymrequired.com/2008/07/clean-air-one-two-punch.html">"Clean Clear Air, Nothing To See Here, Drive Through Please". In the case of flammability chemicals, the states are now forced to the Bush administration standards, despite the limited proof that deaths due to fire are effectively decreased by stricter flammability laws requiring more chemicals. California is now working to amend its own laws to accommodate evidence about toxicity.
Toxic Chemicals Persist
The story of tris's demise as an anti- flammability product is often portrayed by the chemisty industry as a huge regulatory mistake, a case of overzealousness. But was it overzealousness? Or did science work as it should -- but just in that case?
Federal agencies and politicians are exceedingly cautious about banning chemicals when faced with the expanded clout of industry. Take bisphenol A, an endocrine disruptor with far reaching effects in experiments with rats, which seem to be replicated in humans. Children are heavily exposed to BPA as neonates, infants and toddlers. Meanwhile, Canada recognizes BPA as a toxin. Yet despite hundreds of research papers, and decades of questions about the safety of BPA, US politicians are still debating the pros and cons.
Public attention to an issue is influential as the history of BPA shows. But the underlying process for assessing chemical safety is flawed -- if it could be considered in existence at all. The European Union recently implemented REACH to deal with the more systemic problems of regulation for toxic chemicals, as we wrote about here and here. The US has no such program.
Lobbyists persist, and "risk benefit analysis" is often spun-out to cover for politicians dragging their feet on telling chemical companies to come up with a better product. The chemical lobby is so strong that as BPA history shows, even the most convincing body of evidence can be trounced by a few well placed lobbyists who don't let any public conversation stray from industry talking points.
Chemisty Lobbyists -- Planted on the Down Side of the SeeSaw?
Not to say that many organizations don't try to balance the scales. But as the global warming and BPA debates show, their voices are weaker and budgets smaller.
This week the Purpose Prize, funded by the John Templeton Foundation and the Atlantic Philanthropies, awarded six individuals 60 $100,000, and nine others $10,000. The recipients were chosen from 1000 60+ nominees "who are taking on society's biggest challenges". Arlene Blum, a chemist whose research helped convince regulators to remove tris from the market 30 years ago, received the award to continue her work at the Green Science Policy Institute she founded.
Blum is a chemist who worked on the the flame retardant tris (2,3-dibromopropyl) phosphate (tris) in the 1970's. In threeScience articles she published with Bruce Ames et all, the authors looked at the history of flammability chemicals and the toxicity of tris 2, 3. They then analyzed urine samples from kids wearing tris treated pajamas and showed that children absorbed the chemical through their skin.4 Months later tris was banned. In the 1978 paper, Gold, Blum, and Ames wrote. In their 1978 paper Blum and Ames concluded that testing of chemicals and labeling of products was essential to consumer safety.
Despite this quick seeming success, chlorinated tris is in heavy use today Thirty years later, as progress on this aspect of protecting consumer health seems elusive. Blum will put $100,000 to the task. And its a far more daunting task today than it was 30 years ago. The industry is dependent on being unregulated, and has a gargantuan marketing budget with which to keep things laissez-faire, status quo.
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1 The Associated Press, May 5, 1981 "Sleepwear Manufacturers Call Tris Ban 'Regulatory Overkill'"
2 Blum A, Ames BN. Flame-retardant additives as possible cancer hazards. Science. 1977 Jan 7;195 (4273):17-23.
3 Gold MD, Blum A, Ames BN et al. Another Flame Retardant, Tris-(1,3-Dichloro-2-Propyl)-Phosphate, and Its Expected Metabolites Are Mutagens: Science, New Series, Vol. 200, May 19, 1978 (4343), pp. 785-787.
4 Blum A, Gold MD, Ames BN et al. Children absorb tris-BP flame retardant from sleepwear: urine contains the mutagenic metabolite, 2,3-dibromopropanol. Science. 1978 Sep 15;201(4360):1020-3.